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Social interactions issues in group decision-making
Ayeley Tchangani
Abstract— Decision-making is certainly the most widespread
of all human activities, whether individual or by a group. Some
decisions, especially individual decisions, are easy to make and
do not require sophisticated algorithms to arrive at a solution.
Others, on the other hand, and especially in the case of group
decision-making, require the establishment of frameworks,
rules or algorithms of varying degrees of sophistication to arrive
at a satisfactory solution. In this process, the most difficult part
is certainly the modeling and treatment of the relationships
between the actors in the decision-making group. The objective
of this paper is therefore to build a framework for modeling and
analyzing interactions between decision-makers in a group on
computational bases in the sense that these interactions will be
characterized by numerical parameters. The constant concern
in this work is to get as close as possible to human behavior
by using bipolar analysis.
Index Terms— Group decision-making, Social interactions,
Group coordination mechanisms, Bipolar analysis, BOCR anal-
ysis
I. INTRODUCTION
Group decision making or collective choice is a sub-
domain of decision analysis (a discipline comprising the
philosophy, theory, methodology, and professional practice
necessary to address important decisions in formal manner
according to Wekipedia) that addresses decision making
problems where a certain number of decision makers must
select a subset (possibly reduced to a singleton) of alter-
natives from a large set of potential alternatives in order
to achieve some collective as well as individual objectives,
preferences, or desires. Such decision making problems are
encountered in many practical situations such as: manage-
ment (choosing a candidate to fill a job by a panel of experts,
selecting or forming portfolio of projects to fund by a
committee, selecting, a short list of suppliers by members of
a management board, etc.); engineering (choosing alternative
design of an object (a car, a bridge, a road, a dam, etc.) to
be realized by a panel of engineers and/or experts, choosing
appropriate energy for a machine being developed, etc;);
economics (setting up taxes by a government, forming port-
folio of developing projects (transportation infrastructure,
energy infrastructure, communication infrastructure, etc.),
selecting appropriate manner of developing fund raising,
etc.); social (choosing alternative social aid by a ruling
committee, forming social projects (sanitary, housing, waste
management, water infrastructure, etc.), portfolio of activities
by a ruling committee, etc.); politics (electing representatives
for a council, electing a president of a country, etc.); etc.
Some concrete applications of this kind can be found in [1],
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[6], and references therein for some real world applications
even though in these references the problems are most of
the time treated as a single decision maker problems. The
existence of many decision makers necessitates to have a
coordination mechanism (how to aggregate the view points
of all decision makers) in order to reach a choice accepted
by the group. The purpose of this paper is to address such
coordination mechanism.
II. SOCIAL CHOICE FRAMEWORK
Decision making is certainly the most pervasive human
activity; indeed we spend a great proportion of our working
day, hour, minute and even second, making decisions. Some
decisions are made routinely and do not need models to
support them whereas other decisions are so complex or
important that sound decision support models are needed in
order to avoid failure that may lead to very damageable or
catastrophic consequences. These complex decisions share
some features such as: multiplicity of objectives, multiplicity
of attributes or criteria that characterize alternatives, uncer-
tainty, multiplicity of actors, and so on. For these decision
situations there is a need to have procedures or models
that permit to capture all interactions and relationships
between different elements of decision making process in
order to reach an effective and efficient decision. Thus, a
decision analysis problem is structured around the follow-
ing important elements: decision makers, players, actors or
stakeholders that are entities (persons, group of persons,
organizations, etc.) that do have some interest or are engaged
in decision analysis process; objectives (an objective in a
decision analysis problem is something a decision maker
cares about, wants to achieve, wants to optimize, wants to
reach, etc.); alternatives (an alternative is a possibility opened
to a decision maker that may permit him or her to realize
his objectives); attributes or criteria (an attribute is a feature
of an alternative that is used by a decision maker to evaluate
this alternative with regard to pursued objectives).
A collective decision problem is a decision problem where
a certain number (possibly reduced to one) of agents, stake-
holders or decision makers must select, rank, classify, or
sort alternatives from a large set or universe (discrete set)
X = {x1, x2, ..., xm}, of alternatives in order to satisfy some
collective and/or individual objectives.
Classical approaches to coordinate social choice processes
are dominated by electoral systems. An electoral system is
a set of rules that determine how elections and referendums
are conducted and how their results are determined; here is
a brief description of some commonly used electoral rules
to aggregate individual preferences; interested reader can
consult for instance [2] for more details. Basically following
approaches are higlighted in practice.
• Ticking one candidate at most (majority rule, first-past-
the-post or plurality voting that is a system in which the
candidate(s) with the highest amount of vote wins, with
no requirement to get a majority of votes) or several
candidates (approval voting, each decision maker or
voter makes a list of alternatives that he/she wishes to
support and the winner is the alternative that receives
the greatest votes; this is equivalent for a decision maker
to make bipolar list of alternatives namely alternatives
that he/she approves and that he/she disapproves);
• Rank-ordering here, voters rank alternatives in a hi-
erarchy on the ordinal scale (ordinal voting systems);
one of the most representative here is the Borda count
where ballots are counted by assigning a point value
to each place in each voter’s ranking of the candidates,
and the choice with the largest number of points overall
is elected.
• Majority judgment: each voter gives a rating on a
qualitative scale for each candidate (e.g., ”excellent”,
”very good”, ”good”, etc.). For each candidate, the
median score is then calculated, i.e. the best score such
that half of the voters give the candidate a score at least
as good; and the winner is the one who obtains the
highest median score. To decide between two candidates
with the same majority rating, two principles are used;
victory criterion (to have the most voters assigning
strictly more than the common majority mention and
criterion of defeat (having the most voters strictly as-
signing less than the common majority mention). These
two values are therefore calculated for each candidate to
be separated and the larger of the 4 value determines the
result, in order to satisfy the largest number of voters.
III. MODELING SOCIAL INTERACTIONS
If coordination methods evoked in the previous section are
easy to use and well suited for elections in group decision
making, they may lead to some biases in some decision
problems as voters will based their vote on only the positive
aspects of alternative whereas it is well known that alterna-
tives will convey positive aspects as well as negative aspects.
Another issue is that these approaches disregard some social
facts such as interactions and attitude toward members of a
group. Indeed some human attributes make decision makers
integrating some feelings that can be regrouped into two
groups:
• positive feelings: deference (respectful consideration
towards a person, and that brings to comply with his
desires and his will), trust (firm expectation, assurance
of a person relying on somebody or something), em-
pathy (recognition and understanding of feelings and
emotions of another individual), etc.
• negative feelings: indifference (state of the person who
feels no pain, no pleasure, no fear, neither desire),
conflict (encounter of opposing elements, opposing feel-
ings. Synonyms), antipathy (aversion, natural and not
reasoned reluctance for someone), etc.
Positive feelings toward another decision maker may bring
the corresponding decision maker to altruism (disposition to
be interested and to devote oneself to others) whereas nega-
tive feelings will lead to selfishness (excessive attachment to
oneself that make one searching exclusively his pleasure and
his personal interest) toward the former one. Furthermore, in
general, these feelings are not binary but rather a mix of
positive and negative; in the same way the judgment of a
decision maker toward an alternative will convey a mix of
positive and negative aspect.
The attempt to integrate notions of altruism and self-
ishness has been addressed in the literature mainly in the
context of satisficing game theory [7], [8]. In this theory
interaction among agents is taken into account through the
so called interdependent joint function or measures that
can be represented as a praxeic network with 2n + m
possibles nodes if there are n agents and the effect of
nature is considered through m possible states. From this
interdependent function, joint selectability and rejectability
measures are obtained by marginalization of this function
and finally individual selectability and rejectability functions
are derived by marginalizing the joint ones. This approach
rise three observations or objections.
• Tractability: elicitating joint interdependent function
may be tremendous when there are a great number of
decision makers and a large possible states of the nature.
• By deriving individual satisficing measures by marginal-
izing joint satisfiability measures obtained from the
marginalization of joint interdependent function, one is
considering that individual preferences should emanate
from global ones; this is not certainly the case in
practice where one rather must aggregate individual
preferences to reach global preference.
• Mutual influence or interaction among agents are not
taken into account; indeed, by representing the joint
interdependency function by a praxeic network that is
a directed acyclic graph to capture influence between
agents, one does not authorize mutual influence. For
instance if the selectability of agent i is conditioned by
that of agent j, the inverse will not be allowed whereas
in practice this can happen.
In multi-actors decision analysis situation, there is always
some conditionality in the sense that the preferences of
a given actor may be conditioned to that of other ones
[8]. When making decision, an actor may be influenced
by its social vicinity, the influence one actor may have on
another actor result of a sort of combination of positive and
negative perception of later one. Particularly, influence does
not always means positive perception (altruism, deference)
of the influenced actor toward actors that influence him; it
may represent repulsion, aggresivity of the influenced actor
with regard to those influencing him; even for the same
influencing actor, the influenced one may have a sort of
combination of positive and negative perception. Given a
decision analysis situation and two decision makers i and
j, there will be some decision aspects for which j will be in
concordance with i and other aspects for which he will be
in discordance. So, the global influence an actor j may have
on another actor i will result from a combination of positive
perception measured through a concordance degree and a
negative perception measured through a discordance degree,
highlighting the bipolarity concept [12]. In this paper we will
rely on the notion of bipolarity (notion that consists, for an
actor, in viewing or evaluating anything in two directions: a
direction positively seen by the actor and a direction maker
considered to impede his aspirations). Some indices such as
selectability degree (the extent to which a decision maker
considers selecting an alternative), rejectability degree (the
extent to which a decision maker will avoid choosing an
alternative) at the evaluation of alternatives level as well
as other bipolar indices at social level will be introduced
that permit in some extent to embed human attitude into the
decision process.
IV. PROPOSED MECHANISM FOR SOCIAL CHOICE
To resolve a social choice problem, the approach proposed
in this paper considers two levels: individual level and group
level.
A. Individual level: bipolar analysis
At the individual level bipolar analysis framework can be
used for the purpose of elicitation and evaluation of attributes
that characterize an alternative towards achievement or not
of an objective by that alternative. To this end one can rely
on the notions of supportability and rejectability between
pursued objectives and attributes characterizing alternatives
in the sens that an attribute a(x) of the alternative x is
supporting (respectively rejecting) a pursued objective o of
the decision maker if the variations of a(x) and that of o are
positively (respectively negative) correlated. By considering
other inherent aspects of decision making such as uncertainty
and/or internal/external aspects of an alternative, one can
use well established methods such as BOCR (Benefits,
Opportunities, Costs, Risks) analysis [9] [10] and/or SWOT
(Strength, Weakness, Opportunities, Threats) analysis [9] to
elicitate and evaluate attributes given an objective. At the end
of this process and by aggregating separately positive aspect
and negative aspect, each alternative x will be characterized
by its group free selectability measure µ0Si (x) that conveys
its positive aspects and its group free rejectability measure
µ0Ri (x) for decision making maker i; these degrees should
verify probability like conditions that is they are normalized
to sum to 1 over the set of alternative X .
B. Group level
To overcome the three issues raised in the previous section,
we propose a novel approach which underlying philosophy
relies on the ambiguous nature of human beings who are in
general neither purely selfish nor purely altruist when making
decisions that impact the preferences of other agents. Let
define by Ω(i) the social vicinity of actor i that is the set
of actors whose opinion matter for i or that do have some
influence on i, be it negative, positive or both. For each actor
j ∈ Ω(i), let us define the relative concordance degree θcij




ij = 1) to measure the
extent to which the opinion of actor i is in concordance or
in discordance with actor j compared to other actors of its
vicinity Ω(i).
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is a
vector gathering network free selectability measures of










is a vector gathering
concordance degrees of agents in the vicinity of i; θdi
is defined similarly.
• Cwcfmω (Y ) is the Choquet integral of Y associated
to a weighted cardinal fuzzy measure with relative
importance vector ω, see [11].
• 0 ≤ γi ≤ 1 is a degree that measures the altruist (or
deference) attitude of actor i towards decision makers
of its vicinity. Indeed if γi = 1 then decision maker i
does favor its vicinity.
Finally, real satisfiability measures µSi(x) and Ri(x) are
obtained by making a trade-off between group free measures
and deference measures through the selfishness degree 0 ≤















C. Obtaining concordance and discordance degrees





ij = 1) of agent i with regard to its vicinity agent
j ∈ Ω(i) can be supplied by decision maker (in this case we
referred to it as subjective concordance/discordance degree)
or be deduced by the analyst from the prior selectability
and rejectability measures, that we refer to as objective con-
cordance/discordance degree assessment. In the case of this
later assessment process, one needs to dispose of sound mea-
surement tool; to this end we can interpret the discordance
degree θdij as a measure of divergence of opinion of agent i
with regard to agent j in the given context. One measure
encountered that can be adapted for this purpose is the
so called Kullback-Leibler divergence (also called relative
entropy) [4] that meausre how one probability distribution
is different from a second one, reference probability dis-
tribution in mathematical statistics. For discrete probability
distributions P and Q defined on the same probability space
X , the Kullback-Leibler divergence of P with regard to Q










that always verifies DKL (P//Q) ≥ 0. So, let us define by
DdS,KL (i//j) and D
d
R,KL (i//j) the divergence of opinion
or preference degrees of agent i with agent j regarding se-
lectability and rejectability respectively in the given context,
































D. Measuring network influence on individual
Once the final selectability and rejectability measures
have been obtained, it seems logical to try to determine
the degree of influence of the network on the evolution
of the distribution of these measures per individual. The
distribution of final measures for a decision-maker with little
network influence should not deviate significantly from the
network free distribution; thus, the more a decision-maker
is influenced by the network, the more the final and selfish
distributions should deviate. Given the probabilistic structure
of these distributions, we propose to use the Kullback-
Liebler divergence to measure the degree of influence of the
network on individual decision-makers. Note therefore IS(i)
and IR(i) the degrees of influence of the network on the
selectability and rejectability distributions of decision maker





















From materials derived in the previous sections, different
procedures can be used to arrive to a final decision. To
this end, the group must agree over some earliest common
parameters such as: caution or boldness index to use to
manage the trade-off between selectability and rejectability
of alternatives; we assume that the group agree to use a
common value q for this index; indicator that must be used
for final decision (selection or ranking), a function π over
the alternatives set X is defined through selectability measure
µS and rejectability measure µR that is a non decreasing in
µS and non increasing in µR; most used of these functions
are given by equations (12) and (13)




π : X → R, x 7→ π(x) = µS(x)− qµR(x) (13)
Once the group agree over these materials, each decision
maker i can determine its satisficing equilibrium set E iS of
alternatives at the common boldness index q using following
procedure:
• determine its satisficing set Σiq at the boldness index q
as shown by equation (14)
Σiq = {x ∈ X : µSi(x) ≥ qµRi(x)} (14)
• determine its equilibrium set E iS,q that are non dom-
inated alternatives; an alternative x is dominated by
another alternative y for decision maker i if one has
µSi(x) < µSi(y) and µRi(x) ≥ µRi(y) or µSi(x) ≤
µSi(y) and µRi(x) > µRi(y); let us define by Di(x)
the set of dominated alternatives of x for decision maker
i then the equilibrium set E i is given by equation (15)
E i = {x ∈ X : Di(x) = ∅} . (15)
This set is always not empty and as by managing q one
can render Σiq not empty, the satisficing equilibrium E
i
S,q
is given by equation (16)




Now that necessary materials for coordination, namely sat-
isfibaility measures µSi and µRi and satisficing equilibrium
set E iS,q are obtained, we will consider how to use them to
reach a final decision by first adapting classical approaches
(ticking, approval voting, ranking, Borda count), then de-
riving aggregation approches mainly synergistic aggregation
and probabilistic like aggregation approach, weighted mini-
mum distance to ideal alternatives, to end up with consensus
seeking approach.
A. Adapted classical approaches
1) Ticking one alternative at most: The alternative ticked
by decision maker i is obviously that he considers to be the
best in his satisficing equilibrium set E iS,q; let use denote by
τi(x) a binary variable indicating whether the alternative x






















2) Approval voting: The approved set of decision maker i























1 if x ∈ E iS,q
0 otherwise
(20)
3) Rank-ordering (Borda’s count approach): Each deci-
sion maker i ranks alternatives by following relations
x  y ⇐⇒ π (x) ≥ π (y) (21)
where  stands for ”x is at least as good as y” for i; then
calculate Borda’s score Bi(x) for alternative x in the ranking
of i from the best Bi(x) = n to the last Bi(x) = 1 ; the













1) Synergistic aggregation: Let us consider that it is










ωn = 1 (23)
then one can define a global selectability and a global








where × stands for S or R and Θni=1 (.) is an aggregation
operator and then use a single decision maker procedure.
There are many aggregation operators in the literature going
from weighted mean operator to more sophisticated operators
such as fuzzy integrals [3]; in this approach, given the
synergy between the preferences of decision makers, one
may use a Choquet integral associated to a weighted cardinal
fuzzy measure Cwcfmω (.) [10].
2) Probabilistic aggregation approach: If we interpret
satisfiability measures µSi (x) and µRi (x) as the probabil-
ities that agent i select or reject respectively the alternative
x in the given context, and by considering independence
between decision makers at this stage one can define group
selectability and and group rejectability measures µS (x)
and µR (x) respectively to be the joint probability that each
member of the group select (respectively reject) alternative










that can be used for final selection.
C. Minimum distance to ideal alternatives
Let us define by x∗i the selected alternative by agent i that
we refer to as his ideal alternative then the final selected al-
ternative x∗ is obtained by minimizing the weighted distance














where d (x, x∗i ) is the classical Minkowski distance between
x and x∗i in the plan (µR, µS) given by equation (27)












with p = 1, 2, ..., ∞; most used are p = 1 (Manhattan dis-
tance), p = 2 (Euclidian distance), and p = ∞ (Tchebychev
distance, supremum).
D. Consensus seeking approach
There is a consensus if the final reached decision could be
reached by using individual decisions, that is the winner is
a satisficing equilibrium of all decision makers; so to select
the winner one proceeds as following:
• if equation (28)
∩ni=1E
i
S,q 6= ∅ (28)
is satisfied then there is a consensus and the winner
x∗ can be selected within this set by maximizing an


















• if equation (30)
∩ni=1E
i
S,q = ∅ (30)
then decision makers have to rework their E iS,q by re-
ducing the boldness index q until condition of equation
(28) is reached and select the winner using equation
(29).
VI. ILLUSTRATIVE APPLICATION
A. Description and modeling
To illustrate the potentiality of the established method, let
us consider a real-world problem in the domain of waste
management facility location. This application is adapted
from [5] where the objective was to find the most plausible
solution to a municipal solid waste management problem in a
region of Central Finland. We suppose that the choice of this
location is to be made by a group of 5 decision makers with
social structure of Figure 1 where the arrow going from i to






Fig. 1. Example of a social interaction framework
So that the vicinities of these decision makers (A, B, C,
D, E) are given by equations (31) -(35)
Ω(A) = {B,C,E} (31)
Ω(B) = {A,D} (32)
Ω(C) = {A,B,D,E} (33)
Ω(D) = {C} (34)
Ω(E) = {A,D} (35)
Two main objectives have to be satisfied in the view of
authorities, namely:
• o1: enhancement of the socioeconomic situation of the
considered region;
• o2: respect of the environment.
A preliminary study has identified 11 alternatives (see
[5] for the meaning of each alternative) and 8 attributes,
meanings of which are described in the following points:
• a1: net cost per ton,
• a2: global effects,
• a3: local and regional health effects,
• a4: acidificative releases,
• a5: surface water dispersed releases,
• a6: technical reliability,
• a7: number of employees,
• a8: amount of recovered waste.
We consider that the principal goal is to select the most
sustainable site that is the alternative with most social,
economic and environmental scores. But here we merge
economical and social objectives into one objective known
as socioeconomic objective so that we have two objective
functions o1 and o2 that are described below to be satisfied.
• o1: enhance the socioeconomic situation of the consid-
ered region;
• o2: respect the environment.
A bipolar analysis (see [10]) applied to attributes lead to
following repartion of supportability and rejectability of the
two objectives.
ASo1 = {a6, a7, a8} (36)
ARo1 = {a1, a2, a3, a4, a5} (37)
ASo2 = {a6, a8} (38)
ARo2 = {a2, a3, a4, a5} (39)
After normalizing (using linear Weitendorf procedure) data
collected by [5] and aggregating these normalized data con-
sidering attributes to have equal importance in their category,
we obtain results of Table I as evaluation of objectives.










IA 1.1133 2.1507 1.1133 2.1118
IB1 0.7813 1.8068 0.3369 1.6791
IB2 0.6926 1.8264 0.4703 1.6792
IC1 2.2030 3.1153 1.3697 2.4811
IC2 1.9444 3.0894 1.5000 2.4812
IIA 1.4467 2.1522 1.1133 2.1522
IIB 1.1370 1.4252 0.4703 1.2260
IIC 2.3889 2.8412 1.5000 2.2373
IIIA 0.2778 2.0220 0 1.7515
IIIB 0.7535 1.6437 0.0869 1.1502
IIIC 1.7775 2.9108 0.7775 1.9108
TABLE I
APPLICATION DATA
Each decision maker has his own view with regard to the
two objectives to satisfy that permits he to deduce his purely
selfish satisfiability measures µ0Si (x) and µ
0
Ri
(x); to this end
let us denote by αi1 the relative weight of objective o1 for
decision maker i so that µ0Si (x) and µ
0
Ri
(x) are given by








































Let us consider that the numerical parameters characteriz-
ing decision group are given by Table II.
DM αi1 γi δi
A 0.9 0.5 0.5
B 0.5 0.5 0.5
C 0.1 0.5 0.5
D 0.3 0.5 0.5
E 0.7 0.5 0.5
TABLE II
PARAMETERS CHARACTERIZING DECISION MAKERS
Using relations of equations (40) and (41), pure selfish
selectability and rejectability degrees are obtained as Table
III for each decision maker and then divergence degrees
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(x)) and ultimate (µSi(x)/µRi(x))
selectability and rejectability degrees shown on Table
IV and Table V respectively.
By considering same boldness index q = 1 for all decision
makers and from data of Table V, the satisficing equilibrium
sets as defined by equation (16) of each decision makers are
given by equations (47)-(51)
EAS,1 = {IC1, IC2, IIA, IIB, IIC, IIIC} (47)
EBS,1 = {IA, IIA, IIB, IIC, IIIC} (48)
ECS,1 = {IA, IIA, IIC} (49)
EDS,1 = {IA, IIA, IIB, IIC} (50)
EES,1 = {IIA, IIB, IIC, IIIC} (51)
Let us find the ultimate selected aletrnative using some
proposed criterria, namely: ticking one alternative at most,
approval voting, and consensus seeking.
1) Ticking one alternative at most: Let us suppose that
each decision maker used the ratio (µS/µR) between se-
lectability measure and rejectability measure to choose the
ticked alternative, then the paramter τi(x) defined by equa-
tion (17) is obtained as τA(IIB) = 1 and τB(IIC) =
τC(IIC) = τD(IIC) = τE(IIC) = 1. So only decision
maker A should choose other alternative (IIB) than alterna-
tive IIC; alternative IIC is therefore selected alternative.
2) Approval voting: Let us denote by ν(i) the approval
score obtained by alternative i, so we have ν(IC1) =
ν(IC2) = 1, ν(IIB) = 4 and ν(IIA) = ν(IIC) =
5. Two alternatives have the same highest score so the
choice must be made when using additional criterion such as
maximizing the ratio (µS/µR) between selectability measure
and rejectability measure; with this criteria the alternative IIC
is selected.
3) Consensus seeking: as intersection of individual satis-










S,1 = {IIA, IIC} 6= ∅; (52)
there is a consensus arround alternatives IIA and IIC; the
ultimate alternative to implemente selected by using criteria
of equation (29) is alternative IIC.
4) Network influence degrees: One can consider analyz-
ing how network has influenced each of 5 decision makers
by computing degrees IS and IR as defined by equations
(10) and (11); these degrees are shown on Table VI. One
can see from these degrees that decision maker C is the
most influenced by the network and decision maker A is
the least influenced one. One must keep in maind that the
structure of Figure 1 is virtual, decision makers are not
necessary aware of it; so such post decision analysis through
these influence degrees can reveal some social behavior of
members of the group; for instance decision maker D whose
vicinity is reduced to C is more influenced than decisions
makers A, B, and E (network propagation effect).
VII. CONCLUSION
The problem of social interactions in group decision-
making, issues rarely considered in the decision support
literature, has been explored in this paper. The notions of
social vicinity, social feelings (positive or negative) towards
others, altruism or selfishness, etc. have been introduced and
formalized. Finally, the decision-making process have two
levels: at the local level, each decision-maker determines
some parameters using formalized procedures, that will be
used at the group level by aggregation (in the broadest sense)
to arrive at the final solution. Many traditional ways of
aggregating individual choices to arrive to a group choice
such voting (ticking on alternative at most, approval voting,
majority voting, Borda approach, etc.) as well as newer
concept such as consenus seeking are compatible with the
approach developped so fare in this paper; furthermore
somme indices that can be used to measure whow the
social interactions influence individual behavior have been
developped. An illustrative application based on real world
problem shows the applicability of this approach.
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IA 0.0799 0.0874 0.0958 0.0930 0.1195 0.0995 0.1063 0.0961 0.0871 0.0901
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IC2 0.1363 0.1233 0.1481 0.1215 0.1658 0.1195 0.1560 0.1205 0.1417 0.1224
IIA 0.1014 0.0876 0.1101 0.0939 0.1231 0.1012 0.1159 0.0974 0.1054 0.0906
IIB 0.0768 0.0572 0.0691 0.0578 0.0576 0.0586 0.0640 0.0582 0.0733 0.0575
IIC 0.1650 0.1132 0.1672 0.1108 0.1706 0.1080 0.1687 0.1094 0.1660 0.1120
IIIA 0.0179 0.0812 0.0119 0.0823 0.0030 0.0836 0.0080 0.0829 0.0152 0.0817
IIIB 0.0493 0.0649 0.0361 0.0609 0.0165 0.0564 0.0274 0.0588 0.0433 0.0630
IIIC 0.1204 0.1144 0.1099 0.1052 0.0942 0.0945 0.1029 0.1000 0.1156 0.1099
TABLE III
SELFISH MEASURES
































IA 0.0941 0.0936 0.0866 0.0852 0.0898 0.0858 0.1012 0.1012 0.0842 0.0875
IB1 0.0641 0.0586 0.0624 0.0634 0.0624 0.0639 0.0613 0.0613 0.0641 0.0617
IB2 0.0609 0.0601 0.0603 0.0604 0.0586 0.0603 0.0646 0.0646 0.0604 0.0602
IC1 0.1305 0.1392 0.1357 0.1353 0.1308 0.1334 0.1378 0.1378 0.1349 0.1360
IC2 0.1297 0.1367 0.1302 0.1285 0.1299 0.1265 0.1383 0.1383 0.1272 0.1315
IIA 0.1000 0.1036 0.0953 0.0950 0.0951 0.0958 0.1066 0.1066 0.0947 0.0956
IIB 0.0675 0.0593 0.0665 0.0676 0.0678 0.0671 0.0611 0.0611 0.0683 0.0657
IIC 0.1318 0.1481 0.1369 0.1363 0.1322 0.1345 0.1391 0.1391 0.1359 0.1373
IIIA 0.0506 0.0446 0.0493 0.0502 0.0505 0.0502 0.0454 0.0454 0.0509 0.0487
IIIB 0.0587 0.0489 0.0585 0.0597 0.0633 0.0614 0.0431 0.0431 0.0606 0.0576
IIIC 0.1120 0.1074 0.1183 0.1185 0.1195 0.1212 0.1015 0.1015 0.1187 0.1181
TABLE IV
ALTRUIST MESAURES
A B C D E
Alternatives µSi (x) µRi (x) µSi (x) µRi (x) µSi (x) µRi (x) µSi (x) µRi (x) µSi (x) µRi (x)
IA 0.0870 0.0905 0.0912 0.0891 0.1046 0.0926 0.1038 0.0987 0.0856 0.0888
IB1 0.0585 0.0658 0.0553 0.0697 0.0517 0.0717 0.0531 0.0695 0.0574 0.0681
IB2 0.0545 0.0669 0.0551 0.0684 0.0557 0.0700 0.0580 0.0713 0.0547 0.0676
IC1 0.1413 0.1317 0.1447 0.1287 0.1434 0.1265 0.1462 0.1293 0.1439 0.1296
IC2 0.1330 0.1300 0.1392 0.1250 0.1479 0.1230 0.1471 0.1294 0.1344 0.1269
IIA 0.1007 0.0956 0.1027 0.0944 0.1091 0.0985 0.1113 0.1020 0.1000 0.0931
IIB 0.0721 0.0583 0.0678 0.0627 0.0627 0.0628 0.0626 0.0596 0.0708 0.0616
IIC 0.1484 0.1306 0.1521 0.1235 0.1514 0.1213 0.1539 0.1243 0.1510 0.1247
IIIA 0.0343 0.0629 0.0306 0.0663 0.0267 0.0669 0.0267 0.0642 0.0331 0.0652
IIIB 0.0540 0.0569 0.0473 0.0603 0.0399 0.0589 0.0352 0.0509 0.0519 0.0603
IIIC 0.1162 0.1109 0.1141 0.1118 0.1068 0.1079 0.1022 0.1008 0.1171 0.1140
TABLE V
ULTIMATE MESAURES
A B C D E
IS 0.0086 0.0142 0.0536 0.0170 0.0107
IR 0.0056 0.0038 0.0536 0.0053 0.0037
IS + IR 0.0142 0.0180 0.1072 0.0224 0.0144
TABLE VI
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